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owner.8 0 The court should therefore avoid promulgating a rigid rule of
discoverability or nondiscoverability and should adopt a flexible position,
employing procedural rules to avoid unfairness to either party.81
JAMES

R.

CALDWELL, JR.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: LIMITATIONS OF COURT-MARTIAL
JURISDICTION

O'Callahanv. Parker,395 U.S. 258 (1969)
Petitioner, a sergeant on leave from the United States Army, allegedly
broke into the hotel room of a young girl and assaulted and attempted to
rape her. After being arrested by the local police, petitioner was turned over
to military authorities who charged him with three violations of the Uniform Code of Military Justice.'

A court-martial later convicted him on all

three counts. 2 After exhausting his military appellate remedies,3 petitioner
filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in

federal district court and

alleged that the court-martial was without jurisdiction to try him for nonmilitary offenses committed off post and while on leave. The petition was
denied,4 and the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed. 5 On appeal the United States Supreme Court HELD, 6 the court-martial was without

jurisdiction to try nonservice connected crimes, and that petitioner was
deprived of his constitutional right to an indictment by a grand jury and a
80. The distinction between the position of the state in a condemnation suit and that
of the landowner may very well diminish in importance where the landowner is a large
corporation rather than a private person with only small landholdings.
81. Proposed Amendment 26 (b) (4) to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure purports
to provide a uniform approach to the problem of discoverability of experts, including apparently expert land appraisers. See Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the
Judicial Conference of the United States, Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments to
Rules of Civil Procedure for the United States District Courts (1967), 43 F.R.D. 211 (1968).
Proposed amendment 26 (b) (4) is discussed in Note, Discovery of Experts: A Historical
Problem and a Proposed FRCP Solution, 53 MINN. L. REV. 785, 800-05 (1969).
1. UNIFORM CODE OF MILITARY JUsTICE art. 80. 10 U.S.C. §800 (1964) (attempt to commit an offense); art. 130, 10 U.S.C. §930 (1964) (housebreaking); art. 134, 10 U.S.C. §934
(1964) (generally prejudicial acts).
2. United States v. O'Callahan, C. M. 393590 (unreported) aff'd, 16 U.S.C.M.A. 568, 37
C.M.R. 188 (1967).
3. UNIFORM CODE OF MILITARY JUsTICE, arts. 66-67, 10 U.S.C. §§866(b), 867 (a) (1) (review of military tribunal proceedings is provided by a board of review and then by the
Court of Military Appeals).
4. 390 F.2d 360, 361 (3d Cir. 1968).
5. Id.
6.

396 U.S. 258, 89 S. Ct. 1683 (1969).
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trial by a jury of his peers.7 Judgment reversed, Justices Harlan, Stewart, and
White dissenting.
The constitutional guarantee of trial by jury" reflects the English common law existing when the Constitution was adopted. 9 Under English law
prior to 1720, courts-martial could try soldiers only for offenses specified by
the Mutiny Act.10 At the time of the American Revolution British soldiers
accused of an offense punishable by civilian courts were required to be delivered to a civil magistrate."
In 1775 the Continental Congress enacted the first in a series of articles of
war copied from earlier British articles.'12 The general article punishing crimes
"to the prejudice of good order and military discipline" was in substance
incorporated in the first code of 177513 and has similarly appeared in each
subsequent issue of the Articles of War. 4 When such crimes' 5 were committed against civilians and did not occur at or near a military base, they
were treated as civil rather than as military offenses. 16
Not until the Civil War was in its third year were courts-martial given
jurisdiction to try soldiers for crimes committed against civilians. 17 The
authority to do so, however, obtained only in time of war. The Articles of
War of 1916,"s followed by those of 1920,19 introduced the concept of peacetime military jurisdiction over noncapital crimes committed by soldiers. In
20
1950 court-martial jurisdiction was extended to include capital crimes.
The procedure for review of court-martial decisions under American law
also reflects the English practice existing when the Constitution was adopted.
7. U. S. CONsT. amend. V: "No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise
infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury .... "; U. S.
CONST. amend. VI: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a
speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury .
8. U.S. CONsT. art. III, §2; amend. VI.
9. Ex parte Grossman, 267 U.S. 87, 108-09 (1925); Gompers v. United States, 233 U.S.
604, 610 (1914); Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U.S. 275, 281-82 (1897). But see Duncan v.
Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 160 (1968) ("petty offenses" were tried without juries in both
England and the Colonies and have always been held to be exempt from the othenvise comprehensive language of the sixth amendment's jury trial provisions).
10. First British Mutiny Act of 1688, 1 W. & M. c. 5, §55; see I C. CLODE, THE MILITARY FORCES OF THE CROWN 519 (1869).
11. British Articles of War 1765, §XI, art. I, reprinted in W. WINTHROP, MILITARY LAW
AND PRECEDENTS 1448 (2d ed. 1920).
12. Reprinted in W. WINTHROP, MILITARY LAiV AND PRECEDENTS 953 (2d ed. 1920). See
generally Girard, The Constitution and Court-Martial of Civilians Accompanying the
Armed Forces-A Preliminary Analysis, 13 STAN. L. REv. 461 (1961).
13. Articles of War of 1775 (enacted June 30, 1775), reprinted in W. WINTHROP, MILITARY LAW AND PRECEDENTS 1478 (2d ed. 1920).
14. W. WINTHROP, supra note 12, at 720 (now UNIFORM CODE OF MILITARY JUSTICE, art.

134, 10 U.S.C. §934 (1964).
15. Id. at 724, e.g., robbery, forgery, manslaughter, assault with intent to kill, mayhem,
battery, and criminal attempts and conspirades.
16. W. WINTHROP, supra note 12, at 1124 n.88.
17. Act of March 3, 1863, ch. 75, §30, 12 Stat. 736.
18. Act of Aug. 29, 1916, ch. 418, §1342, 39 Stat. 650-70.
19. Act of June 4, 1920, ch. 227, 41 Stat. 787.
20. 50 U.S.C. §578 (1964).
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In England civilian authorities could not interfere with court-martial proceedings.21 In 1858 the United States Supreme Court held that court-martial
decisions were not subject to nonmilitary judicial review.2 2 However, this
basic prohibition against judicial interference did not limit the courts' power
of review under the writ of habeas corpus. 23 In 1953 the Supreme Court enlarged this judicial power of collateral review to include a determination of
whether the court-martial had proper jurisdiction over both the person and
the offenseYa Presently, in addition to review of jurisdiction, federal courts
may collaterally review military determinations when a challenge is made
regarding the constitutionality of an act of Congress, 25 when the military is
alleged to have acted beyond its statutory powers,26 and when first amendment
27
rights are involved.
Speaking for the Court in the instant case Justice Douglas implied that
the early American requirement 28 of civil court trials for civilian offenses
committed by members of the military was determinative of present courtmartial jurisdiction29 This conclusion was based upon his assumption that
the Founding Fathers must have intended the grant of general power "to
make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval
Forces ' ' 30 to be exercised by Congress in light of the limitations on military
authority existing contemporaneously with the adoption of the Constitution.31
Additional support for this conclusion can be found in a series of cases
beginning with Reid v. Covert,32 in which the Court limited the jurisdiction
of the military courts. The Court held that the sixth amendment right to
trial by jury prohibits peacetime court-martial for any offense of civilians
who accompany the armed forces overseas, whether employees or dependents
33
of military personnel.
The jurisdictional test in this series of cases was military "status," or
whether the accused in the court-martial proceeding was a person who could
be regarded as falling within the term "land and naval forces."3 4 However,
in the present case the Court rejected the government's contention that
21.
V. WINTHROP, supra note 12, at 51; Sherman, Judicial Review of Military Determinations and the Exhaustion of Remedies Requirement, 55 VA. L. REv. 483, 486 (1969).
22. Dynes v. Hoover, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 65 (1858); Sherman, supra note 21, at 487.
23. Ex parte Yerger, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 85 (1869); Sherman, supra note 21, at 487.
24. Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137 (1953).
25. Gallager v. Quinn, 363 F.2d 301 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 881 (1966).
26. Robson v. United States, 279 F. Supp. 631, 633 (E.D. Pa. 1968), vacated as moot,
404 F.2d 885 (3d Cir. 1968).
27. Smith v. Ritchey, 89 S. Ct. 54 (1968).
28. Articles of War, note 13 supra.
29. 89 S. Ct. 1683 (1969) (by implication).
30. U. S. CONsT. art. I, §8.
31. 89 S. Ct. 1683 (1969) (by implication).
32. 354 U.S. 1 (1957).
33. McElroy v. Guagliardo, 361 U.S. 281 (1960); Grisham v. Hagan, 361 U.S. 278
(1960); Kinsella v. Singleton, 361 U.S. 234 (1960); see Bishop, Court-Martial Jurisdiction
Over Military-Civilian Hybrids: Retired Regulars, Reservists, and Discharged Prisoners, 112
U. PA. L. REv. 317, 318 (1964).
34. Kinsella v. Singleton, 361 U.S. 234, 240 (1960).
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appellant's military "status" was the dispositive issue in determining the
jurisdiction of the court-martial, and concluded that: "'Status' is necessary for
jurisdiction; but it does not follow that ascertainment of 'status' completes the
inquiry, regardless of the nature, time, and place of the offense." 3 5
While justification for the restriction of jurisdiction in the instant case
rests primarily on the early American limitation of courts-martial to serviceconnected crimes, it is also founded upon the dangers that are "lurking in
a military trial." 36 Justice Douglas acknowledged the genuine need for special
military courts and their propriety in their appropriate sphere. 37 Nonetheless,
he warned that military tribunals as institutions are inept in dealing with
the subtleties of constitutional law; 38 in the last analysis such tribunals are
but a specialized part of the mechanism of military discipline,3 9 and the expansion of that military discipline beyond its proper domain carries with it
a threat to liberty. 4°
The first criticism of the Court's position is its association of the fragments of early American history with the purpose of those who adopted the
Constitution. As the majority admitted,41 actual practice in our formative
era often failed to meet the theory of civil jurisdiction for nonserviceconnected crimes. 42 Justice Harlan noted in his dissenting opinion that the
Court's inconclusive historical data falls short of supporting the majority's
conclusion. Furthermore, the convention debates over the Constitution do not
indicate that Congress was to be forever limited to the scope of court-martial
jurisdiction existing in seventeenth century England.43
Despite this weakness, other factors bolster the majority's conclusion. Although the glory of military victory had not waned, the generation that
adopted the Constitution appears to have been unsympathetic to military
institutions. 4 They were deeply attached to the right of trial by an independent tribunal free from executive control. 45 Within their own lives they
had seen royal governors resort to military rule.46 This attitude of suspicion
toward the military manifests itself throughout American history47 and provides support for the Court's interpretation of the Founders' original under35. 89 S. Ct. 1683, 1688 (1969).
36. Id. at 1687.
37. Id.
38. Id.

39. Id. at 1686.
40. Id. at 1687.
41. Id. at 1690.

42. W. WiNTHRoP, supra note 12, at 724 nn.82, 88.
43. 89 S. Ct. 1683, 1693 (1969) (dissenting opinion).
44. See Madison, The Debates in the Federal Convention of 1787, H.R. Doc. No. 398,
69th Cong., 1st Sess. 564-71, 600-02 (1925); C. WARREN, THE MAKING OF THE CONS IrUION
482-84, 517-21 (1947).
45, Girard, supra note 12, at 487.
46. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 27 (1957).
47. George Washington warned that: "Mercenary Armies . . . have at one time or
another subverted the liberties of almost all the Countries they have been raised to defend
....
" 26 WRMNGS OF WASHINGTON 388 (Fitzpatrick ed. 1938); see Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S.

1, 23-27 (1957).
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standing of the Constitution: that the power of Congress to grant courtmartial jurisdiction over members of the armed forces extended only to
service-connected crimes.
The second criticism of the instant decision is the Court's failure to delineate the general standards that determine when the exercise of courtmartial jurisdiction is permissible. Does the repeated recitation of the facts
in the principal case imply that the holding should be limited to offenses
committed by soldiers stationed in the United States, off duty, off base, and
dressed in civilian clothes? The Army has indicated in a recently issued
directive that the decision is very limited.1s The directive informs all field
commanders that they may still court-martial a soldier for a civilian crime
if committed while wearing a uniform or if the crime bears "a factual relation to military effectiveness." The Army's restrictive interpretation of the
holding is an outgrowth of the Court's omission to formulate definite guidelines for the military to follow. Clearly, the Court restricted its ruling to
peacetime offenses, 9 but the perplexing question of the significance to be
given to each factor (off duty, off base, and civilian dress) is left unanswered.
The search for standards by the lower courts is likely to create such confusion that the result can only be a proliferation of jurisdictional litigations °
Military officials have recently voiced their concern that a retroactive application of the ruling would overturn thousands of court-martial convictions and free hundreds of servicemen now in military stockades.5 1 However,
a comparison of the major constitutional doctrines recently enumerated by the
Supreme Court has laid to rest the argument that every new pronouncement
of constitutional law must always be given full retroactive effect.F2 In 1965
Mapp v. Ohio" was held applicable only to cases in which judgment had
not yet become final at the time Mapp was decided.5 4 Escobedo v. Illinoiswas decided in 1964 and sparked debate over its retroactivity, as did Miranda
v. Arizona-6 in 1966. In Johnson v. New Jersey,57 decided a week after the
Miranda decision, the Court limited the retroactivity of both Escobedo and
Miranda to trials beginning after the date on which these cases were respectively announced. The foregoing examples all relate to procedural re48. DA Message 911375, at 4, Department of the Army, Office of the Judge Advocate
General, June 4, 1969, as cited in N.Y. Times, June 8, 1969, §E at 5, col. 2. The directive

indicated that the Army would construe the decision to "preclude trial by court-martial
only in those cases ... which are unequivocally not . . . service-connected."
49. 89 S. Ct. 1683, 1691 (1969).
50. Id. at 1696 (dissenting opinion).
51. N.Y. Times, June 8, 1969, §E at 5, col. 2.
52. See Schaefer, The Control of "Sunbursts": Techniques of Prospective Overruling,
42 N.Y.L. REV. 631 (1967).

53. 367 U.S. 643 (1961)
applicable to states).
54.

(federal exclusionary rule in search and seizure cases held

Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 640 (1965).

55. 378 U.S. 478 (1964) (right to counsel after the "focus [of the investigation] is on
the accused and its purpose is to elicit a confession").
56. 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (specific rules that must be followed if results of police interrogation of a person in custody are to be used in evidence).
57.

384 U.S. 719 (1966).
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quirements of a constitutional nature. 8 In the area of substantive rights
the Court has held 59 that the rule in Gideon v. Wainright60 requiring states
to furnish counsel to indigent defendants in felony prosecutions is so fundamental to personal constitutional protections and to the very integrity of
the factfinding process that it must be retroactively applied. 61
At first glance, the majority's emphasis on appellant's deprivation of "two
important constitutional guarantees" 62 (right to indictment by grand jury
and trial by a jury of his peers) might seem determinative of the question
of the retroactive effect of the principal case. Upon closer analysis, however,
the Court's concern was with procedural jurisdiction and not with the
Gideon question of fundamental fairness in the court-martial proceeding.
Additionally, the pressures of military stability, administrative inconvenience,
and the change in the Court's personnel 3 will, in all probability, influence
the Court to apply the judicial formula of prospective effect as reflected
in Mapp,Escobedo, and Miranda.
The opinion in the instant case is rather vague regarding both the constitutional limits of congressional power and the definition of "service-connected" crimes. In relying on the limiting principles of early American history,
the Court ignored the practical considerations of today's disciplinary requirements in the armed forces. However, a critical analysis of the instant
case in terms of its historical accuracy and logic should not be made without
particular attention to perhaps what may be the ultimate justification for
the decision. The majority could "see no way of saving to servicemen and
women in any case the benefits of an indictment and trial by jury .. . ." by
concluding that the petitioner was properly tried by court-martial. 64 The resulting expansion of constitutional guarantees to military personnel is desirable, but whatever propriety such expansion may have Congress and the
military are at least entitled to know with some certainty the allowable scope
of court-martial jurisdiction.65
HORACE

58.

EDWARD DEAN, JR.

Note, Retroactivity of Constitutional Decisions, 41 NoTRE DAME LAw. 206, 220

(1965).
59.

Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965).

60. 872 U.S. 335 (1963).
61.

Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618

(1965); see Fairchild, Limitations of New

Judge-made Law to Prospective Effect Only: "Prospective Overruling" or "Sunbursting,"
51 MARQ. L. REv. 254, 264 (1968).
62. 89 S. Ct. 1683, 1691 (1969).
63. Justice Warren Burger assumed his position as Chief Justice in the October 1969
Term of the Supreme Court. Justice Burger has stated that, "Ever since 1689 military
law has been regarded as an unwelcome but necessary abridgment of civil rights." Guagliardo
v. McElroy, 259 F.2d 927, 936 (D.C. Cir. 1958) (dissenting opinion), afl'd, 361 U.S. 281

(1960).
64. 89 S.Ct. 1683, 1691 (1969).
65.

Id. at 1696 (dissenting opinion).
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